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Thursday, October 28, 2010
Villains often espouse Compatibilism
Superman: Darseid. Kara leaves with me.
Darseid: She's free to leave. If that is what she desires.
So in the recent direct to DVD sequel to last year's Superman/Batman: Public Enemies, Superman/Batman: Apocalypse, Superman's cousin (Kara) is kidnapped by Darseid and taken to his terrible war planet: Apokolips. There he changes her. Those changes include evil destructive desires which she didn't previously have. But Darkseid thinks she is still free. But is she really? Her desires were changed agaisnt her will but now she is not capable of willing anything other than her new set of desires.
This seems to be a common theme among villains and supervillains, and its interesting that the same basic view of the will is espoused by Edwardian Calvinist theology. Its free as long as you desire to do what you're doing. That seems false. Kara seems as if she's trapped and not really guilty of the bad things she is about to do. And if that intuition seems correct then so much the worse for compatibilism. But God says: I call heaven and earth to witness against you today, that I have set before you life and death, blessing and curse. Therefore choose life, that you and your offspring may live. (Deut. 30:19)
So choose life and DC Universe DVDs. They're awesome. Not as awesome as life, but still pretty awesome.
"...when [a man] puts a thing on a pedestal and calls it beautiful, he demands the same delight from others. He judges not merely for himself, but for all men, and then speaks of beauty as if it were a property of things. Thus he says that the thing is beautiful; and it is not as if he counts on others agreeing with him in his judgment of liking owing to his having found them in such agreement on a number of occasions, but he demands this agreement of them. He blames them if they judge differently, and denies them taste, which he still requires of them as something they ought to have; and to this extent it is not open to men to say: Every one has his own taste. This would be equivalent to saying that there is no such thing as taste, i.e. no aesthetic judgment capable of making a rightful claim upon the assent of all men."